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BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION. By Hadley Arkes.
Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. ix, 278. $24.95.

Princeton:

In his 1986 book First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles
of Morals and Justice, 1 Professor Hadley Arkes2 sought a return to
what he termed the "original understanding of the foundations of law
and polity." 3 For Arkes, this understanding encompassed a notion of
moral principles not as fortuitous developments of cultural systems,
and not as particular devices for the maintenance of a smoothly functioning societal machinery, to be retooled or discarded when they
cease to serve their purpose, but rather as universal, eternal, necessary,
and discoverable truths. Professor Arkes confronted the "widely traveled fallacy" 4 of moral relativism and decried the abandonment of an
objective ethic that, Arkes maintained, had been fully within the most
basic understanding of philosophers and statesmen from the ancients
to the American Founders.
Bringing to bear an arsenal of Arkes' "first principles," First
Things took aim at a host of modem ethical dilemmas, from abortion5
to wealth redistribution, 6 from the welfare state7 to the nation's participation in the Vietnam conflict. 8 With wit, logic, and perhaps an air of
omniscience, Arkes made a case for the existence of moral principles
carrying the force and inescapability of natural laws. But if the reader
of First Things was convinced, by wave after wave of Arkes' carefully
selected conundra and dogmatic syllogisms, of the existence of an objective morality, it was conviction without comfort. Arkes seemed so
concerned with rejecting moral relativism that he ignored the difficulty
in identifying the universal ethics that were to take its place.
Now, in his new book, Beyond the Constitution, Professor Arkes
has turned his attentions and his ethics toward a different front: constitutional law. In First Things, Arkes disparaged what he perceived
as a juristic trend, since the purer days of John Marshall and Joseph
Story, away from a recognition of the moral principles that underlie
the Constitution and toward the modem confusion stemming from a
misguided textualism. In Beyond the Constitution, Arkes makes a
1. H. ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
JUSTICE (1986).
2. Hadley Arkes is Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at
Amherst College.
3. H. ARKES, supra note 1, at 8.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 360422.
6. Id. at 309-26.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 232-87.
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closer study of the relationship between the Constitution and the basic
moral understandings that, he claims, its text merely reflects.
While the antagonist of First Things was moral relativism, in his
latest book Arkes takes on its jural incarnation, legal positivism.
Arkes decries the "modem heresy" (p. 14)- taught, he assures us, in
all the law schools (p. 15) - that the basic principles behind the
American polity came into being only with the promulgation of the
Constitution in 1787. Lawyers and ordinary citizens alike, Arkes
complains, "have come to speak the language of 'legal positivism' " (p.
81), claiming various rights only "under" or "through" the constitutional text. In fact, asserts Arkes, the Constitution is merely "a
means, an instrument for conveying, in legal structure, the principles
that marked the character of the American republic" (p. 40). And,
says Arkes, the principles around which the Constitution was framed
were part of a natural law understanding in existence long before the
creation of the Constitution itself.
According to Arkes, the modem positivism has led to an almost
idolatrous preoccupation with the constitutional text. Because the
text is seen as the source of political rights and obligations, says Arkes,
that text has become all-important, and the moral truths behind it
have become obscured. The jurisprudence of the Constitution has become one of "slogans rather than principles," characterized by "convenient formulas produced by lawyers" and lacking a discourse for
applying the first principles upon which the document is based (pp. 1819). From this phenomenon, Arkes complains, has arisen a need to
resort to tricky formulas and wordplay in applying the text to contemporary social dilemmas. The Framers, according to Arkes, intended
only that the text provide general guidelines for applying, in each new
case, what Arkes calls the "reasoning spirit" of the Constitution - a
spirit animated not by the necessarily limited scope of the language,
but by the universal principles that the text can only partially reflect
(pp. 21-39).
Indeed, it hardly requires acknowledgement that, as Arkes suggests, the stiff eighteenth-century phrases of the constitutional text
rarely apply with any clarity to dynamic twentieth-century problems. 9
How, then, would Arkes bring the constitutional text to bear on modem issues? Importantly, Arkes seeks neither to rediscover original intent by way of a "quaint project in 'historical' reconstruction" (p. 17),
nor to fill in gaps in the text by appealing to dominant cultural notions
of social justice. This is not to say that the "original intent" of the
framers has no relevance for Arkes. Rather, for him the Framers' "intent" is relevant only as a means of understanding the moral laws that
9. Pp. 21-23. See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITU350-55 (1988); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693, 694
(1976).

TION

May 1991]

Constitutional Law and Theory

1397

the framers themselves understood; it carries no inherent normative
weight merely by virtue of its status as original intent.
This view sets Arkes apart from many modern conservative scholars. Both Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Robert Bork, for instance, ultimately embrace original intent not because of the insights it
might provide into natural law, as Arkes does, but because it represents the first and best word on that positive law which is the Constitution.10 At the same time, Arkes' refusal to accept prevailing social
values as instrumental in interpreting the Constitution separates him
not only from "liberal commentators on the law [who] have been quite
willing to advance a 'living Constitution' " guided by contemporary
mores (p. 11), but also from such critics of positivism as Ronald
Dworkin, who would draw constitutional principles from the "nation's political traditions and culture." 11 Arkes, for whom the Constitution is a reflection of universal, natural law, finds the "habits of the
tribe" (p. 13) of little value in divining constitutional meaning,
whether those habits are traditional or modern in origin.
The Bill of Rights provides the starting point for Arkes' assault on
constitutional positivism. Modern jurisprudence, Arkes laments, has
confirmed the Federalists' fear that the Bill of Rights "would narrow
our understanding of the rights that government was meant to protect" and "misinstruct the American people about the ground of their
rights" (pp. 59-60). Contemporary treatment of the first ten amendments epitomizes for Arkes the dangers of venerating the text (pp. 5880).

Most notable in Arkes' chapter on the Bill of Rights is his contention that these amendments, laying out as they do general rules for the
interplay between personal rights and government interests, fail to
provide adequate grounds for deciding specific ethical dilemmas.
Arkes is correct in recognizing that even given broadly written rules
like those in the Bill of Rights, many difficult cases can be decided
satisfactorily only by applying a justification analysis that is narrow,
fact-specific, and independent of the rules themselves - in essence, by
asking whether, given the specific facts of the case, the government is
justified in restraining an individual's liberty. In these cases, as Arkes
asserts, "the Bill of Rights would make no difference in guiding our
judgment" (p. 69), because even without a Bill of Rights the question
must resolve itself to a weighing of individual interests against govern10. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bork,
Judicial Review and Democracy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1061
(L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14, 20-22 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]; Rehnquist, supra note 9. For an interesting commentary on Justice Rehnquist's notions of original
intent, see Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of the
United States?, 10 u. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351, 423-48 (1987)..
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 378 (1986).
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ment ones. 12 But Arkes' critique of the Bill of Rights extends beyond
these difficult cases: by narrowly labeling each issue as a "free speech"
problem or a "due process" problem, he insists, the Bill of Rights obstructs our view of the underlying, independent principles of justification that should always be applied (pp. 58-80). As such, it does more
harm than good.
In following this road, however, Arkes in essence rejects a rulebased regime in favor of a system of ad hoc adjudication - a system in
which each case is decided based on a careful weighing of its own
particular factors, sui generis, without regard to bright-line rules. One
might seriously question whether such a system is practicable. Indeed,
an important function of the Bill of Rights may well be to provide
bright-line rules that obviate the need for fact-specific adjudication by
clearly instructing government as to how it may, and may not, act.13
Complete fairness is sacrificed for efficiency, adaptability for
consistency.
Arkes also fails to recognize that even where written rules fail to
dispose of a particularly difficult question and adjudication results, the
rules serve another important function: they flag the principles that
must be considered as fact-based adjudication proceeds. In constitutional jurisprudence, when a protected right is at issue in a case, a
process is triggered which requires the balancing of the individual's
right against the interest of the state in restricting it. This process has
become automatic in our courts. 14 But without this shorthand mecha12. Arkes takes as an example the case Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), involving an Orthodox Jewish psychologist in the Air Force who refused, contrary to regulations, to
remove his yarmulke while indoors. As Arkes perceives it, "[w]hether Goldman had a 'right' to
wear his yarmulke in the military would depend on whether there was a compelling, or even
plausible, interest on the part of the government in preserving uniforms and avoiding the use of
sectarian symbols." P. 69. A hypothetical amendment in the Bill of Rights preserving the "right
to wear a hat" would add nothing to the consideration of this problem, Arkes contends, because
"[w]e would still find ourselves weighing the question of whether the army could have a justification for imposing restrictions on certain kinds of headgear." P. 69. The addition of a specific
"right to wear a hat" would not eliminate the task of analyzing whether, in this particular case,
the government's interests were strong enough to justify restricting Goldman's personal freedom.
13. Ideally, a written Constitution would avoid litigation by enumerating easily understood
rules for government to follow. Litigation would be avoided because neither government nor
citizens would be confused about what the rules mean; there would be no need for courts to
interpret the rules, and there would be little incentive for government to break the rules, knowing
that any violation would be readily apparent and easily determined by the courts. In the real
world, of course, rules cannot be perfectly expressed, nor can they be created to anticipate every
possible situation; certainly, they can never achieve both ideals. In fact, common sense suggests
an inverse relationship between the specificity of a rule and its adaptability. Thus there is a
considerable gray area in which government action must be reviewed by the courts on a case-bycase basis. But Arkes' approach, taken to its logical conclusion, would seem to imply such a fact·
specific adjudication in nearly every case (since facts will always differ slightly from case to case).
14. Consider, for example, the chain of "clear and present danger'' cases involving first
amendment rights, where the individual's right of free expression has been balanced against the
threat to society that such expression has posed: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Dennis v. United States, 341U.S.494 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
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nism, in the form of the Bill of Rights, for signaling the need for justification analysis, one of two things is likely to happen: either rights
must wither away outside the glare of constitutionally mandated judicial scrutiny, or the courts must of their own accord establish the
existence of rights - a process beyond the reach of the electorate,
subject only to the discipline of judicial precedent, and lacking the
indelible permanence of an authoritative text. 1s
Arkes' mistrust of the Bill of Rights notwithstanding, he would not
dispose of the written Constitution entirely. To Arkes, the Constitution stands as an estimable attempt at the mechanics of a representative government; federalism, separation of powers, checks and
balances, and the like were innovations of considerable genius
designed to aid public servants, already versed in the logic of morals,
in their application of that logic to everyday governance. But these
concepts, in Arkes' eyes, are not themselves dictated by the logic of
democracy; they are merely prudential measures, "a frame of government, a legal structure" for the smoother functioning of the polity (p.
246). In this sense, the Constitution to Arkes is simply that which
works best. 16
Understanding this view of the Constitution as essentially a docu249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
15. Such judicially established rights, of course, exist even with the Bill of Rights, a salient
example being the "right to privacy" firmly set down in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and alluded to or expanded upon in, inter alia, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But it is worth asking whether the Court in Griswold would
have discovered such a privacy "right" without the Bill of Rights from which to work. And
unlike the textual rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and the like, this privacy right
exists much more at the whim of, and control of, the oft-changing personnel who make up our
Supreme Court.
16. Graham Walker, in a recent work, writes that to Arkes the Constitution is "a windowpane, letting in on public life as much of the pure light of moral principle as prudence determines
feasible." G. WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 62 n.127
(1990). To Arkes, Walker continues, the goal of constitutional interpretation is "to arrive at the
point where the glass is no longer even noticed because of the brilliance of the sunlight." Id. But
for Walker, the difficulty with this view is that it
seems to evacuate the very notion of a constitution; it reduces a constitution to a fiction of
prudence. If, in the final analysis, this is what constitutions are, why then bother with them
at all? Why not just set about making sure that those who hold the levers of power are
virtuous and prudent?
Id. at 62-63 n.127. Walker's answer is that even moral realists like Arkes implicitly recognize
that human beings cannot be trusted to be virtuous and prudent; that is, they doubt that leaders,
unguided by a constitutional text, are capable of always (or even often) making the right moral
decisions. See id. at 18-22, 60-61, 62-63 n.127, 149-52. One aspect of this argument is simply the
recognition that, as I contend below, no adequate means exist of identifying ultimate moral
truths or of reaching a consensus about what is virtuous (or, for that matter, prudent). Arkes
fails to acknowledge this difficulty. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29. Another facet of
the argument is the equally valid point that even given a hypothetical moral consensus, there is
every possibility that leaders will choose not to act in accordance with it. This possibility, of
course, would only be increased in the absence of written normative guidelines promulgated in a
constitution. Arkes seems to recognize the usefulness of the Constitution in this sense when he
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ment of utility is the key to understanding Arkes' approach to constitutional jurisprudence. If the Constitution is only a means of applying
deeper principles of morality and justice, Arkes asserts, then certainly
it cannot hinder the application of those principles (pp. 40-57, 112-49).
Thus, in a case where application of such a principle is clearly in order, the absence of specific textual language should not prevent the
principle from applying. And it is equally incongruous to apply the
principle only through creative cajoling of the existing language to
produce a textual mandate. For Arkes, the simple and logical step is
to apply the principle directly, not under some forced logic tied to a
specific clause but through the straightforward logic of all the clauses
- of the very structure of a free and just society.
From this premise springs Arkes' complaint that the constitutional
clauses have become "whole subsets or sections of our jurisprudence"
(p. 82) - self-contained and self-perpetuating bodies of law that trigger "entirely separate logics and [give] rise to distinct lines of juridical
construction" (p. 82). The effect, says Arkes, has been needless confusion in Supreme Court constitutional analysis. In this vein, Arkes
chides the Court for splitting into factions based upon which clause is
proper where the majority would, in fact, reach an identical result. 17
For Arkes, this kind of battle of the clauses is both unnecessary
and counterproductive. It is unnecessary because a case like Edwards
v. California, 18 involving a state's restriction of emigration into its territory, can be decided with equal force using either the commerce
clause or the privileges and immunities clause. 19 And it is counterrefers to the document as a "special framework[] or regime[] with distinctive rules" (p. 92)
which "supports a regime of freedom rather than a despotism" (p. 12).
Graham Walker's book also is notable in that, like Beyond the Constitution, it devotes considerable space to a critique of modem constitutional theorists who deny the applicability of normative morality to constitutional interpretation. See G. WALKER, supra, at 9-22 (surveying
contemporary constitutional theory and its treatment of the role of moral norms).
17. He illustrates this problem using, inter alia, the case Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); see infra note 18.
18. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The case involved a California resident, Edwards, who had brought
his brother-in-law, an indigent Texan, to California in violation of a Depression-era state law
prohibiting the import of indigent persons. Edwards' conviction under the law was unanimously
overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court, but the justices followed different lines of reasoning.
The majority opinion applied the logic of the commerce clause, holding that the California law
imposed an unjustifiable burden on interstate commerce, 314 U.S. at 170-77, while Justices
Douglas and Jackson each wrote concurrences rejecting the commerce clause as a suitable mode
of analysis and applying the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 314
U.S. at 177-81 (Douglas, J., concurring), 181-86 (Jackson, J., concurring). Using the commerce
clause to overturn a state law restrictive of personal movement, both concurring justices argued,
inappropriately trivialized such restrictions by placing them in the category of regulations governing "the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal." 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The right of interstate travel was more basic, inherent in the notion of national citizenship.
19. Underlying each clause, asserts Arkes, is the recognition of "the logic of a 'nation' " - a
logic that implies "a territory in which people [are] free to move without encountering barriers
cast up without warrant by the separate states." P. 89. Thus, as Arkes would have it, the
"framework of the American Constitution," and not just a single specific clause, "creates a presumptive 'right' on the part of persons-to travel freely within the territory of the United States," a

---
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productive because analysis of cases within the strict boundaries of
specific constitutional clauses obscures the need to refer to underlying
laws of ethics. For Arkes, a right that arises from the logic of the
Constitution, like the right to travel freely among the states, can in the
end only be restricted "for reasons that are compelling and justified"
(p. 92). And this kind of analysis, Arkes asserts, requires application
of principles that are extraconstitutional - the "canons of justification," or "the standards that we use more generally when we try to
distinguish between the justified or unjustified reasons for restricting
personal freedom" (p. 93). The ground rules created by the Constitution - such as free movement among the states - imply to Arkes the
application of extraconstitutional, natural law principles to judge disputes arising from those rules.
In this discussion of the clauses (pp. 81-111 ), Arkes again reveals
his preference for case-by-case adjudication over a rule-based system,
and his argument here is subject to the same critique as his treatment
of the Bill of Rights. 20 However, here Arkes mistrusts the jurisprudence surrounding the clauses more than he mistrusts the text itself,
and his barbs have some sting. As Arkes suggests, the Supreme
Court's treatment of the clauses over the years has reduced analysis of
many kinds of constitutional problems to little more than a "jural shell
game" (p. 102). One aspect of this has been a judicial dishonesty
about the supposed immutability and singularity of the clauses. Arkes
quite rightly points out that while in some cases, such as Edwards v.
California, the justices spar over which clause may properly be applied
as if each clause is "freighted with a special juridical significance" (p.
102), in other cases the Court does not hesitate to treat the clauses
interchangeably where the most obvious choice (say, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment) is textually inapposite.21
Arkes also asserts that judges, while paying lip service to the
clauses as self-contained, unique sets of principles, have in fact not
hesitated to decide cases, almost subconsciously, according to extraconstitutional principles of justification (p. 110). This point, too, is
well taken. In a sense, as Arkes writes, our judges "have acted in the
right that "arises distinctly from the character of the American polity." P. 92. Because the right
stems from the logic of the Constitution itself, quibbling over which clause to apply is a superfluous exercise in hair-splitting.
20. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
21. P. 102. A telling example, mentioned by Arkes (pp. 100-03), is Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which a U.S. Air Force regulation discriminating against servicewomen
who sought to claim their husbands as dependents was struck down as violative of due process.
During the previous term, the Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), had struck down
similar discriminatory legislation by the state ofldaho on the basis of the equal protection clause.
The Frontiero Court, however, could not use the equal protection clause because the fourteenth
amendment does not expressly apply to the federal government. But the Court was not shy
about transposing wholesale much of the Reed equal protection logic to the due process context
- right down to a sentence, quoted from Reed, in which the words "Equal Protection Clause"
were replaced with the word "Constitution" in brackets. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690.
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style of men who have rediscovered natural law, and yet they themselves can speak only the language of legal positivism" (p. 110).
Again, a potent example is the Edwards case, where despite the disagreement over which constitutional clause to apply - an issue the
justices themselves saw as crucial - each separate opinion seemed finally to tum on the extraconstitutional, moral notion that indigence in
itself is not a just reason for restricting personal autonomy rights. 22
This core understanding of Beyond the Constitution - that the
constitutional text should not get in the way of the extraconstitutional
principles that must be applied in each case - also animates Arkes'
notions of federalism, 23 especially in the context of civil rights (pp.
112-49). Here he argues that extenuated interpretations of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, or resort to the commerce clause
to regulate Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama, 24 are unnecessarily strained means of dealing with the problem of private discrimination. If society views private discrimination as a wrong, as statutes
like the Civil Rights Acts suggest, then action by the federal government against such discrimination need not be justified by barely credible semantic arguments. The Founders, Arkes asserts, understood
that "the defense of [civil] rights formed the distinct mission of the
federal government" as well as the very "rationale for the Constitution" itself (p. 124). As such, the logic of the Constitution would allow the national government to regulate local, private discrimination
directly without feeling bound by any "state action" restrictions of the
constitutional language.
Of course, this sort of argument lends itself readily to a "slippery
slope" critique: where does federal action find its limits, and what is
left of the role of state and local government? Arkes seems to suggest
that the limits are those set by a combination of tradition and prudence (pp. 128-30, 141, 148-49). The Founders, he asserts, never intended that the federal government take over "that full matrix of the
common law that was present already in the laws of the states" (p.
128) - laws on marriage, divorce, public amusements and displays,
the preservation of the local peace, and so forth. And, says Arkes, the
22. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Poverty and immorality are not
synonymous."); 314 U.S. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hose who [are] stigmatized by n
State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds" must not be "relegated to an inferior class of citizen·
ship."); 314 U.S. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of
rights nor a basis for denying them.").
23. To Arkes, federalism is at best a set of "rules of prudence or statecraft" (p. 120) designed
to foster local enforcement of the laws wherever possible; the federalist system does not represent
" 'apodictic' or necessary truths" (p. 120) bound up with the very notion of a constitutional
government itself. Because of this, then, for Arkes there is no "class of wrongs, within the reach
of the Jaw, but outside the reach of the national government." P. 111. The national government
is competent under the Constitution to redress any wrongs, even narrowly local ones perpetrated
by private actors; that the government does not do so should be considered merely an exercise of
commonsense restraint rather than obeisance to the commands of any first principles.
24. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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national government would have no need to intervene in an area where
local enforcement is quite adequate; only where some structure of the
local government itself makes it either unwilling or unable to cope
with injustice would federal regulation be required (pp. 129-30).
This is not an argument that is likely to ease· the fears of diehard
federalists. But Arkes' main point, that no wrong that deserves redress is beyond the reach of the federal government, does not lose its
force for the intimidating breadth of its implications. Indeed, if the
primary concern regarding such plenary federal power is the potential
for abuse, it is not clear that such potential is present to a greater
degree when power is exercised by the federal government than when
it is exercised at the local level.
In its discussion of federalism here, as with its treatment of the Bill
of Rights and the clauses, Beyond the Constitution is essentially a work
of iconoclasm. If not quite denouncing as a false idol the constitutional text, if not quite taking the torch to it, Arkes would cast away
the intricate, gilded reliquary built up around the text by years ofliteralist jurisprudence. He would reemphasize the message to an audience
woefully distracted by the medium. But if his project succeeds in alerting us to the existence of principles of judgment beneath, and beyond, the textual Constitution itself, it leaves us grasping for a firm
hold on just what those principles are. If we cannot reach a consensus
on the meaning of the words, how are we to agree on the principles
that give them their force? If we cannot interpret the letter of the
Constitution consistently, by what means are we to understand its
spirit?
The failure to address these questions satisfactorily is perhaps the
greatest flaw of Arkes' book, and it reflects the obvious weakness inherent in any argument of moral realism. It is one thing to flag the
existence of extralegal ethical principles; it is quite another thing to
identify them; and it is a harder task still to propose a means for obtaining a consensus about them. 25 Not that Arkes suggests that absolute consensus is necessary, or even possible. But one detects curious
evidence in Beyond the Constitution that Arkes fails to appreciate the
deeper difficulties involved once a conversation takes on the language
of absolute moral principles. In his first chapter, for instance, Arkes
quotes a passage by Robert Bork:
There may be a natural law, but we are not agreed upon what it is, and
there is no such law that gives definite answers to a judge trying to decide a case.
There may be a conventional morality in our society, but on most
issues there are likely to be several moralities. 26
25. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles. supra note 10, at 30; Bork, The Struggle Over the Role
of the Court, 34 NATL. R.Ev. 1137 (1982); Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 704-05.
26. P. 14 (quoting Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, supra note 25, at 1138).
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Arkes takes this passage as an indication of the rejection, by Bork and
other modem conservatives, of the existence of universal moral truths.
But it seems here as if Arkes mistakes a recognition by Bork that people disagree - and always will - over what propositions are moral
truths, for a denial of the existence of an absolute, if elusive, morality. 27 This is an error in perception that seems to follow Arkes
throughout Beyond the Constitution, obscuring inevitable clashes between opposing moral schemata with the blanket epithet "moral relativism." Arkes appears slow to recognize that cutting through the
moral relativists' smokescreen does not solve the problem of whose
"morality," in the end, must stand as the true and universal one.
The difficulty of identifying norms becomes acute when we seek, as
Arkes would have us do, to discover the principles that underlie the
constitutional text. It appears that Arkes would posit, as the ultimate
ethic animating the notion of a constitutional government, the principle that no one should be inflicted with a punishment or a burden
without justification. Here is a view of the Constitution, and of morality, espousing personal freedopi as its highest (but not its sole) value.
Perhaps this view is correct in an objective, universal sense. But
the problem, readily apparent, is that its truth or falsity remain unverifiable. There may be some who would propose an entirely different
animating principle behind the Constitution - the maintenance, for
instance, of a regime in which no person enjoys any physical or
psychic comforts which cannot reasonably be enjoyed by all. This is
an equality-based schema, and, as with Arkes' first principle, there is
support for it too in the text of the Constitution.28 And yet, often it
may conflict quite directly with the principle that Arkes espouses:
providing for equality of comfort may require, at times, the punishment or burdening of individuals (through, perhaps, the removal of
their property) without ''justification." Or, it may simply be said that
the goal of equality of comfort provides the "justification" necessary
for consistency with Arkes' principle. But this too opens a Pandora's
box: What amounts to "justification?" Some might find it in the
struggle for absolute equality, others in the need to promote the
"greater good," and still others in the mission of preserving, at all
costs, the habitat of the homed owl.
These kinds of questions cannot be answered, as Arkes would seek
27. Indeed, Judge Bork would appear to recognize not only the existence of immutable
"moral harms,'' but also the validity of using the law to proscribe them. See Bork, Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITU·
TIONAL POLITICS 166 (M. Cannon & D. O'Brien eds. 1985). His complaint is not with the
practice of "legislating moral standards," id. at 168; rather it is with the application by judges of
their own moral views, irrespective oflegislative or original intent. See also Bork, Neutral Princi·
ples, supra note 10.
28. E.g., U.S CoNsr. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1; amend. XIII; amend. XIV,§ 1; amend. XV; amend.
XVI; amend. XXIV.

May 1991]

Constitutional Law and Theory

1405

to answer them, through "the logic of morals." Every moral principle
that aspires to universal application - "no punishment without justification" - would seem to require the presence of another moral principle to interpret it (the goal of absolute equality, for instance, to
provide "justification"). Finally, the interpretation of morality (and
justice, and the ends of a polity) must come down to a purely personal
exercise, whether that person be Hadley Arkes, Ronald Dworkin, or
one of the Founders. Natural law cannot break this moral freefall,
because it is perceived differently by every natural lawyer. Moral
truths are not like chemical reactions; they cannot be reproduced in a
test tube. In the end, only intuition separates our ethics from being
merely applications of prudence, of trial and error.
The fault of Beyond the Co~titution is not its failure to prescribe a
universal legal and political ethic free from subjective notions of truth;
no one yet has done it, of course, no one may be expected to do it, and
probably it is impossible. The fault, rather, lies in Arkes' failure to
recognize the impossibility of the task. · Most likely we can agree with
Arkes that certain truths animate our Constitution, our polity, our
basic understanding as Americans and free citizens. We may even be
able to agree on what a number of those truths are. In this sense his
book is important and helpful; it challenges us, gently, to back away
from the words of the Constitution and seek out the truths behind
them, to recognize the existence of greater principles that give life to
the text. But Beyond the Constitution leaves one questioning the ultimate value of the enterprise. If judges, lawyers, and statesmen cannot
agree, in our world of diversity, upon the superficial concepts contained in the clauses, one wonders how they are to identify the weightier principles that lie beyond the text. Ultiinately, the language of
moral realism fails at the task Arkes seems to have set for it; alone, in
its essential indeterminacy, it cannot lay the foundation for a solid
constitutional jurisprudence.29
These reservations notwithstanding, Beyond the Constitution is
worth reading. It may be a book of political philosophy more than it
is a book of constitutional analysis, and as such it may appeal more to
the philosopher and the political theorist than to the lawyer or the
constitutional scholar. For his part, Arkes can scarcely hide his desire
that the book be read, in a most reflective mode, by judges above all
others; one suspects, though, that we have moved too far along in our
jurisprudence for Arkes' message to settle in the ears of a welcoming
audience. If there is one thing that Arkes, the political philosopher,
fails to appreciate fully about the esoteric world of the lawyer, it is the
29. See generally G. WALKER, supra note 16 (arguing that any constitutional theory based
upon extraconstitutional moral norms must take into account the fact of moral indeterminacy,
and pointing to Augustinian philosophy as the proper mode for application of morality to constitutional discourse).

1406

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1395

lawyer's obsessive and ritual concern for precedent. To ask that our
judges disregard two centuries of doctrinal buttressing of the clauses
as so much extraneous clutter is to ask too much.

- Christopher J. Peters

